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[S]o machen wir uns zum voraus die Idee von einer Wis-
senschaft des reinen Verstandes und Vernunfterkenntnis-
ses, dadurch wir Gegenstände völlig a priori denken. Eine 
solche Wissenschaft, welche den Ursprung, den Umfang 
und die objektive Gültigkeit solcher Erkenntnisse 
bestimmete, würde transzendentale Logik heißen müssen, 
weil sie es bloß mit den Gesetzen des Verstandes und der 
Vernunft zu tun hat, aber lediglich, so fern sie auf Gegen-
stände a priori bezogen wird, [...] 
(Kant 1786: 82-83) 

 
 
1.1   TRANSCENDENTAL VS. FORMAL LOGIC 
 
The distinction between transcendental and formal logic in early transcendental 
philosophy by Kant (1786) and Fichte (1812) rested in part on a misconception 
of formal logic. Formal logic was understood as complete, unique and 
unchangeable. The tradition of Aristotelian logic was considered complete 
because of the stability of the canon in teaching this logic. Since the field of 
formal system analysis was not even on the horizon (at least for these authors) 
the idea of different logics (of speaking of “logics” in the plural) was beyond 
imagination. Formal logic was thought to be concerned with laws that (really) 
apply to our reasoning and are – in modern parlance – “psychological real” in 
our minds. In as much as logic was considered to be unique and universal – 
maybe not so much because the theory of evolution was unknown – it was also 
considered to be unchangeable.  
The task of the logician or the philosopher teaching logic was to set out the 
canon, a task that could be given a paradigmatic form and then be repeated 
without change over and over again. There was nothing new to be learned about 
logic, only new generations of students had to be initialized.  
The canon consisted of Aristotelian syllogistic (in its presentation by the 4 
figures and supplemented by some “immediate” inferences and “conversions”). 
This was further supplemented by a ragbag of well-known inference like Modus 
Ponens, Disjunctive Syllogism, Modus Tollens and a few more. The theory of 
inferences was accompanied by a theory of fallacies, where this seemed to be 
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necessary, since there was no correspondence between fallacies and inference 
rules (respectively failures in their application). Further on, since inference was 
not a very broad field of study the theory of concepts and the theory of 
judgement were considered to be part of formal logic (there being no 
independent field of philosophy of language). 
In distinction to this transcendental logic was concerned with the building or 
making of judgements, which were just given to formal logic. Synthesis was the 
topic of how concepts are employed or unified by reason to arrive at a 
judgement. Transcendental logic asked for the pre-conditions to arrive at 
judgements, the conditions of possibility of judgements. This included, at least 
for many transcendental philosophers, to answer the sceptic who denied our 
chance to make true judgement about reality or to talk about real objects in our 
judgements or to talk systematically and coherent about real objects in our 
judgements. In comparison to formal logic, which presupposed answers to these 
questions and doubts, transcendental logic was considered the ultimate concern 
of the philosopher. Transcendental logic was prima philosophia. Transcendental 
logic dealt with the conditions of possibility of our experience or judgements 
about objects as conditions of these objects themselves. In this Kantian original 
perspective the principles to be discovered by transcendental logic had to be 
principles preceding any empirical investigation and had to be principles of 
synthesis, thus the task of transcendental logic was to outline a canon of 
synthetic a priori principles/judgements. 
 
 
1.2   KEEPING THE ESSENTIALS  
OF TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 
 
One may well asked which elements of the Kantian picture of transcendental 
logic – later repeated slightly modified by Husserl (1929) – are more essential 
than others. Traditionally (i.e. at least in many parts of Neo-Kantianism and the 
Phenomenological movement, but also in parts of (early?) analytic philosophy) 
the border between philosophy and the sciences was drawn around the feature of 
being empirical or  a priori. Philosophy is considered an a priori science in this 
tradition. This idea is beset with the many problems not only to define what “a 
priori” means, but also how we know that something is a priori. The latter 
question may concern us later on. The main thesis of this paragraph, however, is 
that the idea of philosophy being a priori was just a side-effect of the idea of 
dealing the preconditions of thought and judgement.  
To investigate the conditions of possibility of experience, thought, judgement is 
the essential idea of transcendental philosophy. Transcendental philosophy – and 
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thus transcendental logic as its analytic core – is directed at the basic conditions, 
rules and presuppositions made in our cognitive faculties. If it turns out that 
some knowledge about these faculties has to be acquired or checked empirically 
we still have the transcendental question (of the conditions of possibility). In as 
much as these are meant to be conditions of possibility (not only actuality) one 
may suppose that transcendental philosophy has some a priori  or conceptual 
parts. How they relate to empirical investigations of cognition has to be 
considered. And there is a methodological reflection on the wide reflective 
equilibrium between such supposedly a priori methods as conceptual analysis 
and rational re-construction, and the other methods, mostly empirical, of the 
cognitive sciences (cf. Stein 1996, Terman 1993). I understand transcendental 
philosophy as being part of the wider study of cognition (in the cognitive 
sciences). It deals not with the actual details and features of the human psyche or 
human brain, but tries to outline some necessary features (conditions and rules) 
of having thoughts at all, of being able to judge at all. The value of its analysis 
has to be assessed not only by confronting them with other philosophical 
theories, but also by confronting them with our empirical knowledge about the 
workings and limitations of human cognition. Whether one wants to call it a 
priori is of no importance at all, once its methods are set out and kept apart from 
other approaches in science. Especially any pretence of “a priori” meaning 
“unrevisible” has to be dropped, having done philosophy not a single favour. 
Furthermore, I consider the preoccupation of transcendental philosophers with 
scepticism a blind alley. Transcendental arguments are often seen as a reply to 
radical forms of scepticism or to “a sceptic”. Replying to “a sceptic” seems, to 
me, to be a waste of time, and so I confine myself to a few general remarks. 
1. As soon as a sceptic makes some positive claim denying α he finds 
himself much in the same position assuming the possibility of knowledge 
or language as the philosophers under attack. Thus he can be easily 
refuted ad hominem. 
2. If to circumvent this self-refutation the sceptic is considered to “merely 
pose a question” one may ask what that question is. If it has the form 
“Could it not be that …” the meaning of “could” is far from clear. It 
certainly cannot be presupposed to be understood in terms of possible 
worlds or the like, on pains of falling back to point 1. Whether a vague 
sense of imagining other “possibilities” should be taken seriously cannot 
be taken for granted. I don’t. If the question has the form “Are you sure 
that…” one may well ask why one should answer such a question once 
one has given reasons for one’s views. A reasonable doubt (i.e. a new 
doubt that argues for a need of further clarifications) has to be answered, 
but a reasonable doubt then falls back to point 1. 
3. Alternative theories should not be subsumed under the label “scepticism” 
to avoid confusing the issue of scepticism. So someone who doubts 
whether there is something like meaning in the sense of theory T1 may 
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better be called a “critic” as long as she does not doubt meaning in 
general. 
4. Being even a modest realist one assumes that there is or at least may be a 
gap between our representations, our cognitive faculties with their 
abilities and the complete structure of reality. To exclude the possibility 
that reality is – in some vague sense – greater than our cognition would be 
giving up realism and switching to some form of idealism in which the 
limits of our cognition define what there can be. So a “scepticism” 
belabouring this gap should not be considered scepticism at all, as long as 
no specific limit of our cognition is mentioned, which would lead back to 
points 1 or 3. That there are some parts of reality beyond our abilities 
does, further on, not exclude that in some parts our abilities are quite 
appropriate.  
5. Presenting the standard that the gap between belief and reality has to be 
bridged before an argument can be said to be successful is requiring from 
us to become idealist only to accuse us then for giving away realism! The 
whole debate around the corresponding “failure” of transcendental 
arguments (cf. Stern 1999) seems to be misguided. 
6. Arguments on scepticism often start like “suppose a sceptic”. One 
wonders whether there really is or has been anyone claiming what “the 
sceptic” is said to claim or ask. That no non-fictional sceptic can be 
presented is an observation relevant to the very issue of scepticism. If 
someone can really find somebody who claims to doubt the existence of 
things or other people he should ask him for his wallet, his car and maybe 
suggest to him to jump from the next bridge. Any non compliance with 
these suggestions is relevant to the very issue of the existence of sceptics.  
The aim of transcendental arguments thus does not lay in refuting sceptics but in 
delineating analytic dependencies between concepts or assumptions. In seeing 
that α is a condition for the possibility of γ we recognize a conceptual 
connection within our conceptual scheme. Phrasing this discovery as “If a 
sceptic were to doubt γ she could not believe α.” adds nothing to it. 
Successful arguments sometimes show that some premises entail a conclusion, 
sometimes the premises make the conclusion plausible. Sometimes a premise of 
normality (like “nothing is different in other situations”) or exhaustiveness (like 
“and these options considered are all the options there are”) has to be added to 
make an argument sound. Such premises may turn out wrong. So may be the 
way of science and scientific progress. As long as no reasonable doubt has been 
presented, however, we are justified in seeing these arguments as establishing 
their conclusion. They may even stand as they are for all time to come. To 
require stricter standards for arguments has to be argued for concisely itself. I 
have not seen such arguments. Hinting at such a ultimate justification does not 
suffice. Recent attempts for ultimate justification in “apodictic evidence” (in 
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some period of Husserlian phenomenology) or “reflexive ultimate justification” 
(in Apel and Kuhlmann’s [1985] transcendental pragmatics) are less than 
precisely worked out. The only point of raising the standards of justification and 
argument seems to be to keep some “sceptic” in business (cf. point (4) above). 
Transcendental logic need not aspire to outdo all sciences and argumentations in 
its rigour. Formal (re-)constructions, meta-logic and conceptual analysis are 
useful and difficult enough.  
The proper idea of transcendental philosophy focuses on several areas to be 
dealt with. There are questions before and beyond empirical science. These 
questions concern – inter alia – those of setting up at least the core of the 
linguistic framework of the kind of study in question. The core of the linguistic 
framework is not concerned with the definition of theoretical concepts of the 
science in question, but with questions like the expressive power of the 
linguistic framework needed (e.g. do we need higher order quantification in that 
area or do we need a syntactic/semantic category of processes) and the arsenal 
of inferential methods (e.g. do we have to be able to have probability 
assignments and procedures of conditional updating). A couple of these 
questions are somewhat continuous with foundational studies in a field of 
science. Especially so if they are concerned with the regional ontology that sets 
apart the region of investigation (i.e. with essential regional concepts like 
organism or force). Some concepts and questions, however, are so general that 
they are not treated even in foundational studies of individual sciences. 
Questions about the nature of truth and sufficient justification or the comparison 
of seemingly equally coherent theories (including an outline of what coherence 
consists in) belong in this category. Even in those cases where there is some 
overlap to foundational studies (say in arguing for basing temporal ontology on 
points or on intervals) the scientists are now engaged not in typically empirical 
investigations, but in a typically philosophical reflection on the proper 
construction of a linguistic framework. Whether this kind of reflection on the 
(linguistic) conditions of possibility of the best theory is done in the philosophy 
department or somewhere else does not change the character of the problem.  
One field of questions that cannot be dealt with by empirical science on pains of 
a massive naturalistic fallacies are, of course, ethical questions. Inasmuch as 
transcendental philosophy is concerned with the conditions of possibility of all 
thought and action and basic ethical principles may be part of these 
preconditions a transcendental ethics (in the manner of Kantian or Discourse 
Ethics) is part of transcendental philosophy. It is not part of transcendental logic, 
and so we do not treat of it here. 
The investigation of the fundamental linguistic framework operates with two 
basic ideas: the existence of a transcendental conceptual scheme and the 
universality of logic and core concepts. 
Transcendental contains more substantial claims than “merely” laying out the 
logical form of thought. The most general forms of thought, since they are part 
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of the necessary conditions to apprehend objects and make judgements at all, are 
part of the laws of reason. Since reason is universal (i.e. all beings with reason 
have the same reason [as faculty]) so are these laws and the corresponding 
claims of transcendental philosophy. By exploring the possibility to make 
judgements at all transcendental logic is the foundation for any theory of truth 
(in general). Every specific discourse or field of empirical exploration is 
founded in this investigation, and it shares the most general features that 
characterize reason. Expressed in terms of analytical philosophy: the 
transcendental investigation is concerned with the most general features of 
language (as a means of communication and representing thought). To be 
explained is not the framework of some individual language – be it formal or 
natural – but the universal frame which is presupposed by all these languages. 
This talk of “conceptual schemes” has been criticized by Davidson (1974) as the 
“third dogma of empiricism”. Davidson’s thesis, however, is directed against the 
claim that there might be several conceptual schemes which are in-
commensurable with respect to each other. The claim of incommensurability 
requires that these schemes are not translatable into each other, and this claim is 
incompatible with a Davidsonian theory of meaning, which starts with the 
concept of interpretation (or translation). A supposedly untranslatable language 
(incorporating a supposedly incommensurable conceptual scheme) can never be 
identified as language in the first place, since we start with our understanding of 
what a language is and identify some behaviours as possible targets of 
translation; and at the same time we had to identify it as language to give the 
incommensurability thesis its proper content. The claim of there being several 
incommensurable conceptual schemes thus destroys itself. There may be beings 
the behaviour of which is not translatable, but once we are able to identify 
something as language we impose the most general features of our framework 
on the target. We employ here (with these means of translating and identifying) 
our universal (or transcendental) framework of language. Thus within our kind 
of linguistic life form the concept of language (and what more specific general 
features go with it) is one and not many. The many natural language share the 
features that the universalist tries to identify. Formal languages – that usually 
abstract from some dimension of language, usually pragmatics as a whole – 
share some of the features that define, for example, what it takes for an 
expression to be composed or to have meaning. Davidson’s complain about 
talking of several conceptual schemes should so be read as highlighting the fact 
that we already have taken our stances within our conceptual scheme. There has 
to be something that is shared by the many languages. The problem is to identify 
these features. The task of universal linguistic philosophy is to identify the 
features of the transcendental frame of language. It might not be much, and it 
might be quite formal or parameter ridden what is universal in this sense, but it 
has to be there. 
Transcendental philosophy thus is universal. And it should be. Philosophy 
cannot restrict itself to non-universal languages. The language of philosophy has 
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to be semantically closed. Philosophy does not want to deal only with the 
structure or conditions of talking in some specific language or languages of 
some kind, but aims at a theory of the basic structures and conditions of having a 
language in general.  
This requires the corresponding resources to express the universal claims. There 
may not be a hierarchy of languages so that we always talk in a last meta-
language the semantic properties of which cannot be made clear, except in a 
further turn of the screw (a new meta-language ...). Universal theories of 
meaning, truth, knowledge etc. were not to have if we can talk only from some 
meta-language "down" to some distinct object-language. A general statement 
like 
(1) Knowledge is true belief. 
would be not well-formed. But these are the very theories that philosophy is 
after. And notwithstanding their lip-service to hierarchy solutions of the 
antinomies most philosophers propose their general theories of meaning, truth, 
belief, reference, knowledge etc. They are right to do the latter, since we have 
such universal concepts. 
There seems to be no crucial difference between formal languages and natural 
languages with respect to the properties being of interest here (i.e. semantic and 
structural properties), although formal languages have no native speakers, 
mostly no pragmatics, no socio-linguistics – and so on. 
We can investigate and formalize the logical structures of any natural languages. 
That is one of the central tenets of logic and formalization. We not only talk 
about properties of all (natural) languages, it seems even incoherent whether 
there could be two completely incommensurable languages. Such a system 
could never be identified as a language at all.  
There are several logics. This is, however, hardly evidence against universalism: 
Often standard first order logic and set theory are taken as the meta-language to 
prove theorems about the logic in question; sometimes – as it should be in 
intuitionism or dialetheism – the meta-language is taken to be the same logic as 
the one introduced or explained;  but in all cases the logic and its formalisms are 
argued for in natural language texts. Natural language turns out to be the last 
meta-language, that meta-language in which the most basic formalisms of some 
other meta-language were introduced. And natural language turns out to be the 
universal meta-language in that all the formal constructions and sentences of 
some new system can be translated (read) as ordinary sentences with some 
formal regimentation. There is no extraordinary special or deviant new logic 
which can say something that we cannot say in (some) natural language. Natural 
language thus contains the understandability of all these systems. What 
structures are responsible for this may the task of advanced transcendental 
philosophy to find out. And we have to make a further distinction between those 
languages which are possible as such and those which are feasible in the sense 
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of being the medium of communication and representation of embodied, finite, 
interacting social beings like us intervening in and adapting to a law governed 
environment. 
Our concept of language, therefore, involves unity and universality. There has to 
be a set of properties defining what a language is. These properties are preserved 
in change or translation, they are exploited to establish correspondences. 
Elucidating these properties and making them explicit from our intuitive 
understanding of language(s) is the traditional understanding of (transcendental) 
philosophy (of language). Without semantic closure we would not be able to 
elucidate a concept that we seem to have! 
Transcendental philosophy in face of the paradoxes coming with semantic 
closure becomes a version of dialetheism: There are true contradictions within 
the universal framework and logic has to be adapted accordingly (cf. Bremer 
2005). 
Corresponding to this universal scope of its investigations transcendental 
philosophy needs the logical means to speak universally. Thus transcendental 
philosophy needs a universal logic.  
There are two readings of having a universal logic: weak universal logic and 
strong universal logic. A universal logic might be universal as a paraconsistent 
logic, i.e. in all fields in which we need a paraconsistent logic this logic can be 
employed and gives acceptable results. This may be called the weak universalist 
program. One may take the weak universalist program as being extremely 
cautious: One takes one's favoured paraconsistent logics – and sticks to it in all 
contexts. Since this paraconsistent logic can deal with contradictory contexts it 
can deal with any context, so it really is universally applicable. The problem 
with this extreme caution is that one loses all otherwise available consequences 
in consistent contexts. Therefore one rather tried to distinguish the type of 
context one is reasoning in. In praxis this meant that we employ standard first 
order logic for all non-semantic or non-antinomic contexts and switch to 
paraconsistency only in our formalization of complete semantics (or, maybe, set 
theory).  
Or a truly universal logic can be employed everywhere, supposedly containing a 
way to distinguish consistent from inconsistent contexts, without loss of proper 
logical power in comparison to first order logic. This may be called the strong 
universalist program.  In case philosophy contains consistent contexts and uses 
arguments valid only in consistent contexts it seems to need to follow a strong 
universalist program. 
Both the LFI-approach in paraconsistent logic (cf. Carnielli/Coniglio/Marcos 
2004) and Adaptive Logics (cf. Batens 2000) follow the idea to be able within 
the system used to distinguish contexts of a stronger logic (usually standard first 
order logic) and contexts for a paraconsistent logic. The way they do it is 
completely different, however. In the LFI-approach the distinction what kind of 
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context we have has to be given beforehand; only given the corresponding 
knowledge can we choose the appropriate formalization (i.e. use °A or not). In 
Adaptive Logics we mark the supposition that some formula has to be 
consistent, a supposition that may be revised in the process of reasoning; no 
prior knowledge about the consistency behaviour of a context is required. Some 
rules like Disjunctive Syllogism [¬A, A∨B?B] and ex contradictione qoudlibet 
[¬A, A ?B], and all derived rules depending on them, have to be restricted. 
Restriction means here that they are only used if the on the left hand side of the 
application no contradiction is involved. Without adaptivity we had to reason 
using some paraconsistent logic in all contexts which we suppose to contain 
contradictions. Given that quite a lot of standard logic is missing (including 
contraposition, transitivity (of identity) etc.) that is a severe restriction. We 
cannot capture a lot of (harmless) consequences in that field then. Philosophy as 
that area of universal talk about semantics and epistemology would have to use 
such a restricted logic. It is questionable how many of its theses and arguments 
could really (i.e. without hidden recourse to standard logic) be expressed. 
Adaptivity, on the other hand, makes clear that reasoning from the present 
contradictions is rather the exception than the rule. 
That we are in the vicinity of some really universal logical principle may be 
revealed by our failure to negate this principle in asserting something. Logical 
principles built into our faculty of logic and language used in communication 
will be principle that can only be attempted to negate by uttering some statement 
which is the formal negation of this principle but in which case we have an 
immediate and obvious performative contradiction between the content of the 
statement and the presuppositions of the act of assertion going on at that time. 
So to say “I do believe A ∧ B, but I do not believe A.” is self-destructive in that 
the “but” works logically as an “∧” and so the statement makes sense only if 
both conjuncts uttered are taken to be in force by the assertion, which is what the 
assertion overtly tries to negate. 
 
1.3  RE-CONSTRUCTION  
AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
 
Following the linguistic turn the proper object of study of transcendental logic 
are the ways we linguistically communicate. The conditions of possibility which 
transcendental philosophy is concerned with are more appropriately taken as the 
fundamental conditions and norms that have to be in place to communicate with 
language at all. Examples that may illustrate this idea are a system of 
memorizable shared representatives (a necessary condition) and the adherence to 
truth (a necessary norm). Without a system of symbols that speaker and 
audience (roughly) share and which on occasion the speaker and audience can 
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fetch from some memory store of linguistic representations they cannot do what 
we do: talk about a gone shared experience. Without striving at our assertions 
making true statements (in most cases) there would be no point in fitting our 
actions to what others say, since their assertions would not even roughly 
correlate with environmental conditions. 
There is a multitude of discourse structures. On the one hand we may distinguish 
discourse types like scientific discourse – the one type typically in focus – and 
aesthetic discourse, which (obviously) cannot aim at intersubjectively shared 
truth in the sense of scientific knowledge. On the other hand we can direct our 
investigations not only at the structure of sentences and statements, but also on 
the illocutionary acts involved in making statements or the presuppositions and 
implicatures in a situation of cooperative communication. 
One may doubt whether singling out language as the object of study leaves 
something essential out. Everything we are concerned with at least can be talked 
about. Thus there should be some way of talking the analysis of which links us 
to the topic in question. Not everything is language. So trivially analysis of 
language is no substitute for looking at the world or doing empirical science. 
The general features of a kind of topic (be it art, be it social institutions …) 
have, however, to be expressed or be expressible within our linguistic 
conceptual scheme. This also holds true for feelings, sensations and acts of 
thought, which are often claimed to be beyond the reach of any science (cf. 
Nagel 1986). Also in case of inner states and mental events, however, we talk (a 
lot) about them. Inner “perception” is articulated in sentences of self-report. It 
seems to be a necessary condition of having predicates for our psychological 
states that we share them with each other and are able to attribute them to one 
another (cf. Strawson 1957). So if we take all the reports and utterances dealing 
with inner states and events it is far from clear whether an analysis of this field 
of linguistic expression cannot yield essential insights about the structure of our 
mind. Just like the analysis of scientific language yields essential insights about 
the structure of reality, at least inasmuch as we conceive of it. Even if in the 
order of things reality precedes science or the intentional the linguistic – at least 
the latter may be doubted – in the order of scientific and philosophical 
understanding language and the analysis of discourse is our point of departure. 
The phenomenological tradition has taken another stand on this, of course. By 
and large phenomenology, however, has failed to establish a shared area and 
methodology of research with commonly accepted substantial theories. A lot if 
of this has, I believe, to do with its appeal to subjective insight into the essential 
structures of consciousness, in contrast to analysing language. Nevertheless I 
believe that phenomenology in the Husserlian sense should be part of 
transcendental philosophy, at least when it is philosophy of mind (cf. Woodruff-
Smith/Thomasson 2005). Phenomenological description is an important 
heuristic, as it may be (even) for empirical psychologists. Phenomenological 
description is, further on, one way to secure or access some of our intuitions 
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about our mind. Since the philosophy of mind deals with our mind and its aim is 
to reach some reflective equilibrium between the empirical cognitive sciences 
and our self-understanding this further approach to collect our intuitions is 
important and a further balance against too quick a dismissal of our folk self-
understanding. 
The idea of re-construction is that philosophy is not only concerned with 
invented formal languages or systems but mainly with our natural language and 
its conceptual scheme. Therefore the task of the philosopher may sometimes be 
to construct languages (with all the tolerance that Carnap had in mind). The task 
of the transcendental philosopher is to re-construct the structure and principles 
of natural language. Because these structures and principles are already in use 
the formal explication is a re-construction.  
One understanding of Carnap’s slogan “to plan languages” and his “principle of 
tolerance” (cf. Carnap 1933) may see Carnap as advocating complete 
instrumentalism and relativism with respect to linguistic frameworks. Extreme 
conventionalism fails in fixing the set of (proper) logical truths: If a semantic 
idealist (claiming that truth can be generated by convention) believes that any 
convention can do, he is subject to the famous “tonk”-counterexample of absurd 
rules for introducing and eliminating logical connectives. An “or”-like 
introduction rule with an “and”-like elimination-rule yields “A ∧ ¬A” even for 
consistent statements A. Non-logical truth – at least in part related to the idea of 
correspondence – is not generated by convention either. Extreme 
conventionalism or extreme logical pluralism as a version of semantic idealism 
is incompatible with even mild versions of realism. There is more to the “old” 
Frege/Russell-theory that the laws of logic correspond to the most general 
structures of the world. Comparing different ways to express a universal logic is 
thus not idle. One of them has to be the best one. Even if all questions that we 
can put are questions internal to our conceptual scheme that does not mean that 
they are trivially answerable. The main problem of transcendental philosophy is 
that this very framework is not explicitly given. Thus we lack the representation 
of the framework in respect to which all structural questions are decided. The 
exploration of transcendental philosophy set out to re-construct this frame. 
Comparing several of these (partial) re-constructions we may improve the 
picture, and by improving the picture reject some universal logics as less 
appropriate renderings of our linguistic faculties. Philosophical arguments 
concerning formal ontology and logic might be read then as arguments to the 
appropriate representation of the transcendental frame. 
Since the principles of the transcendental frame are already in use, and have 
been in use all the time, there is no independent point of view from which they 
may be perceived or even explained by something else. Being a condition of 
possibility just means that there cannot be a standpoint outside of them. Even in 
elucidating their workings and connections we have to make use of them. 
Transcendental logic thus never steps out of a virtuous circle elucidating the 
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fundamental principles always in use. With respect to some forms of discourse 
we may take a step outside (say when we in theoretical discourse outline the 
principles of aesthetic discourse), but with respect to the common core 
principles (like distinguishing between what is said and conditions of fit) this is 
not possible. Transcendental philosophy so never explains the structure of 
language and thought by reducing it to something else or something more 
fundamental. It is rather an elucidation of ongoing processes and unalterable 
conditions. Even if within broad reflective equilibrium one may say that some 
principles are implemented in this or that part of the mind/brain and thus are 
realized in physical tokens or even types, this does not substitute for the internal 
re-construction of their workings. 
Living in this transcendental circle transcendental logic is always self-referential 
and has to use a semantically closed universal language, that does not 
distinguish in its resources between the objects and the level of theory (object- 
and meta-language). This may lead to some antinomies and ultimately to some 
form of dialetheism, but so be it. The transcendental circle and universality are 
the only alternative to (Wittgensteinian) mysticism, ineffability or – rather 
common – ignorance of the transcendental scheme. 
Formal models in philosophical logics can thus often be seen from the 
perspective of transcendental logic as re-constructions of part of our conceptual 
scheme as it pertains, say, to concepts like belief or duration. A transcendental 
perspective on these philosophical logics focuses not only on their inner 
coherence and adequacy to some formal semantics, but tries to place these 
models within a reflective equilibrium with corresponding (linguistic) intuitions 
and scientific results. 
Conceptual analysis aims at such formal presentations. It presupposes that there 
is some semantic structure to the transcendental framework. Transcendental 
arguments, arguments of conceivability and model building all aim at tracing the 
semantic roles and connections in this framework. Since there is this semantics 
and the conceptual analysis traces its workings its essential results are analytic 
sentences, one may even say that successful elucidation of the transcendental 
framework reveals the synthetic a priori principles at work in our mental 
faculties. Again (as with the case of the Apriori) nothing depends on these 
labels, which have had their share of philosophical bad press. Notwithstanding 
this conflict with current tastes the status of the principles explicated by 
transcendental logic is beyond those of mere empirical generalizations.  
Conceptual analysis itself has had its share of philosophical bad press. In part – 
as with phenomenology – this might have been because of the sometimes 
subjective quality of its findings or musings. Extended empirical investigations 
and technical research certainly outstrip the means of a (couple of) researchers. 
Conceptual analysis seems to provide the conditions of possibility from an easy-
chair perspective. Nonetheless, if there are innate concepts they are a priori 
from the individual speakers point of view. Conceptual analysis then should 
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have a chance of succeeding (with respect to basic concepts). Some conditions 
of thought may be accidental (like being tailless), but nevertheless it is far from 
clear whether we can imagine us without them. For example: We may imagine 
how it might be to walk around with a tail, but this is far from imagining a 
completely different way of life (including tail fashions, tail poetry, famous tail-
related historical events etc.). Thus finding the actual conditions (simpliciter) of 
thought may be the more secure way of proceeding and understanding what is 
involved in being human. Necessary conditions may leave out too much. Even 
within conditions simpliciter some are easily recognized as being more central 
than others (e.g. being able to write is more central than having two instead of 
three hands that might be used in writing). Empirical cognitive science therefore 
may go a long way towards the traditional aims of epistemology. Nonetheless – 
as with the case of phenomenology – conceptual analysis has to play its part in 
transcendental philosophy, the seeming subjectivity of some of its findings will 
be checked in broad reflective equilibrium with other findings and other models. 
 
 
1.4  SUPPLEMENTARY NATURALISM 
 
Naturalism can be understood as the ontological thesis that everything is 
physical. This thesis stands in no conflict with the agenda of transcendental 
logic. Naturalism can also be understood as the methodological thesis that 
everything can be comprehensively dealt with and explained in physics. This 
thesis, which already falters with the complete reduction of biology to 
chemistry, is in conflict with the agenda of transcendental logic. Naturalism in 
another understanding can, however, play a great role for a re-defined 
transcendental logic. 
As mentioned before, cognitive science tries to establish a wide reflective 
equilibrium that not only relates our pre-scientific intuitions (prejudices and 
judgements) to formal models of our cognitive abilities but takes into account 
the results of all empirical sciences (like neurophysiology or evolutionary 
psychology) that deal with (human) cognition (cf. Stein 1996). How the mind 
works cannot be seen from the philosopher’s study alone. It also cannot be seen 
by taking the exclusively external perspective of neurophysiology. The 
philosophical contribution to this wide reflective equilibrium contains not just 
the formal model building, re-construction, meta-logical investigations already 
mentioned. It contains, additionally, conceptual analysis and phenomenological 
descriptions. It, further on, contains a stock of historical arguments and theories, 
which – maybe under re-description or new analysis – express some of our 
understanding of our cognition, which did not change that much since Hume’s 
or Descartes’ days. Informal logic as the study of these theories of logic or 
epistemology (cf. Finocchiaro 2005) has to be taken into account. 
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Against imperialistic methodological naturalism normativity is to stay. Our 
concepts of rationality in general and logic in particular are tied to the idea that 
we command some consequences to be drawn, some actions to be done if  the 
addressee is to stick to being rational or logical. In this sense logic is – as 
philosophers like Kant and logicians like Frege have always stressed – a 
normative science like ethics (“an ethic of belief”). Complete elimination or 
reduction of the corresponding normative vocabulary to the exclusively 
descriptive vocabulary of a future complete physics or neurophysiology is, 
therefore impossible. There is no corresponding eliminativist virtuous circle like 
the transcendental circle. An ethnological or socio-linguistic or historical 
description of patterns of language use is compatible with the transcendental 
program. If linguistic behaviour is rule governed, a systematic description of it is 
adequate only if the observer has understood (and included in her description) 
what the standards are and how the standards are enforced. And having 
understood the rules governing the linguistic behaviour the individual behaviour 
is straight forwardly explained using these rules as (part of the) premises. The 
behaviour is explained on the level of linguistic “laws”. An anti-reductionist 
should have nothing to complain here.  
Naturalism helps out transcendental philosophy and broadens its perspective in 
cases where non-empirical solutions to a problem may fail or where models are 
proposed that are way beyond the capacities of actual humans. Cases in point – 
although all these examples are controversial – may be the problem of natural 
categories in concept building or semantical rules (cf. Hirsch 1993, Bremer 
2002), the adherence to inductive generalizations or the rejection of scepticism 
(cf. Nozick 1993). 
Empirical data on the psychology of proof (cf. Manktelow 1999) or the limits of 
ideal reasoning (cf. Cherniak 1986) are important to keep the models of 
philosophical logics and re-construction on the right track of analysing human 
and not angelic cognition. Empirical data and psychological theories of, say, 
irrationality may account for cases that otherwise would have to be considered 
as counterexamples to philosophical theories of rationality. 
Naturalism understood in this way is a supplementary naturalism. 
  
 
1.5  TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTATION 
 
Transcendental argumentation does neither aspire to refute “the sceptic” nor 
does it present a standard of argumentation that outdoes all other justifications 
(cf. §3). 
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